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| Authors | |
| No. 1 | GENERAL INTRODUCTION: A Dangerous Plan Of Benefit Only To The "Aristocratick Combination" |
| No. 2 | We Have Been Told Of Phantoms |
| No. 3 | New Constitution Creates A National Government; Will Not Abate Foreign Influence; Dangers Of Civil War And Despotism |
| No. 4 | Foreign Wars, Civil Wars, And Indian Wars - Three Bugbears |
| No. 5 | Scotland And England - A Case In Point |
| No. 6 | The Hobgoblins Of Anarchy And Dissensions Among The States |
| No. 7 | Adoption Of The Constitution Will Lead To Civil War |
| No. 8 | The Power Vested In Congress Of Sending Troops For Suppressing Insurrections Will Always Enable Them To Stifle The First Struggles Of Freedom |
| No. 9 | A Consolidated Government Is A Tyranny |
| No. 10 | On The Preservation Of Parties, Public Liberty Depends |
| No. 11 | Unrestricted Power Over Commerce Should Not Be Given The National Government |
| No. 12 | How Will The New Government Raise Money? |
| No. 13 | The Expense Of The New Government |
| No. 14 | Extent Of Territory Under Consolidated Government Too Large To Preserve Liberty Or Protect Property |
| No. 15 | Rhode Island Is Right! |
| No. 16 | Europeans Admire And Federalists Decry The Present System |
| No. 17 | Federalist Power Will Ultimately Subvert State Authority |
| No. 18-20A | What Does History Teach? (Part 1) |
| No. 18-20B | What Does History Teach? (Part II) |
| No. 21 | Why The Articles Failed |
| No. 22 | Articles Of Confederation Simply Requires Amendments, Particularly For Commercial Power And Judicial Power; Constitution Goes Too Far |
| No. 23 | Certain Powers Necessary For The Common Defense, Can And Should Be Limited |
| No. 24 | Objections To A Standing Army (Part 1) |
| No. 25 | Objections To A Standing Army (Part 2) |
| No. 26 | The Use Of Coercion By The New Government (Part 1) |
| No. 27 | The Use Of Coercion By The New Government (Part 2) |
| No. 28 | The Use Of Coercion By The New Government (Part 3) |
| No. 29 | Objections To National Control Of The Militia |
| No. 30-31 | A Virginian On The Issue Of Taxation |
| No. 32 | Federal Taxation And The Doctrine Of Implied Powers (Part 1) |
| No. 33 | Federal Taxation And The Doctrine Of Implied Powers (Part 2) |
| No. 34 | The Problem Of Concurrent Taxation |
| No. 35 | Federal Taxing Power Must Be Restrained |
| No. 36 | Representation And Internal Taxation |
| No. 37 | Factions And The Constitution |
| No. 38 | Some Reactions To Federalist Arguments |
| No. 39 | Appearance And Reality - The Form Is Federal; The Effect Is National |
| No. 40 | On The Motivations And Authority Of The Founding Fathers |
| No. 41-43A | The Quantity Of Power The Union Must Possess Is One Thing; The Mode Of Exercising The Powers Given Is Quite A Different Consideration (Part 1) |
| No. 41-43B | The Quantity Of Power The Union Must Possess Is One Thing; The Mode Of Exercising The Powers Given Is Quite A Different Consideration (Part 2) |
| No. 44 | What Congress Can Do; What A State Can Not |
| No. 45 | Powers Of National Government Dangerous To State Governments; New York As An Example |
| No. 46 | Where Then Is The Restraint? |
| No. 47 | "Balance" Of Departments Not Achieved Under New Constitution |
| No. 48 | No Separation Of Departments Results In No Responsibility |
| No. 49 | On Constitutional Conventions (Part 1) |
| No. 50 | On Constitutional Conventions (Part 2) |
| No. 51 | Do Checks And Balances Really Secure The Rights Of The People? |
| No. 52 | On The Guarantee Of Congressional Biennial Elections |
| No. 53 | A Plea For The Right Of Recall |
| No. 54 | Apportionment And Slavery: Northern And Southern Views |
| No. 55 | Will The House Of Representatives Be Genuinely Representative? (Part 1) |
| No. 56 | Will The House Of Representatives Be Genuinely Representative? (Part 2) |
| No. 57 | Will The House Of Representatives Be Genuinely Representative? (Part 3) |
| No. 58 | Will The House Of Representatives Be Genuinely Representative? (Part 4) |
| No. 59 | The Danger Of Congressional Control Of Elections |
| No. 60 | Will The Constitution Promote The Interests Of Favorite Classes? |
| No. 61 | Questions And Comments On The Constitutional Provisions Regarding The Election Of Congressmen |
| No. 62 | On The Organization And Powers Of The Senate (Part 1) |
| No. 63 | On The Organization And Powers Of The Senate (Part 2) |
| No. 64 | On The Organization And Powers Of The Senate (Part 3) |
| No. 65 | On The Organization And Powers Of The Senate (Part 4) |
| No. 66 | From North Carolina |
| No. 67 | Various Fears Concerning The Executive Department |
| No. 68 | On The Mode Of Electing The President |
| No. 69 | The Character Of The Executive Office |
| No. 70 | The Powers And Dangerous Potentials Of His Elected Majesty |
| No. 71 | The Presidential Term Of Office |
| No. 72 | On The Electoral College; On Re-eligibility Of The President |
| No. 73 | Does The Presidential Veto Power Infringe On The Separation Of Departments? |
| No. 74 | The President As Military King |
| No. 75 | A Note Protesting The Treaty-Making Provisions Of The Constitution |
| Nos. 76-77 | An View Of The Appointing Power Under The Constitution |
| Nos. 78-79 | The Power Of The Judiciary (Part 1) |
| No. 80 | The Power Of The Judiciary (Part 2) |
| No. 81 | The Power Of The Judiciary (Part 3) |
| No. 82 | The Power Of The Judiciary (Part 4) |
| No. 83 | The Federal Judiciary And The Issue Of Trial By Jury |
| No. 84 | On The Lack Of A Bill Of Rights |
| No. 85 | Concluding Remarks: Evils Under Confederation Exaggerated; Constitution Must Be Drastically Revised Before Adoption |